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Cannabis regulation: Lessons from the illicit 
tobacco trade
Background
Since 2013, a number of countries and local juris-
dictions around the world have legalised and reg-
ulated their cannabis supply chains for non-med-
ical use. Lawmakers, regulators, researchers, and 
advocates continue to design, enact, implement 
and revise regulatory frameworks for medical and 
recreational cannabis. And yet lessons from reg-
ulating other psychoactive substances, including 
tobacco products, are not always fully considered.
The experience of the illicit tobacco trade is par-
ticularly relevant for cannabis regulation. There 
are of course significant differences between 
the two substances. Cigarettes kill over 7 million 
people worldwide annually,2 and between one 
half3 and two thirds4 of their users. Non-combus-
tible cannabis products, in contrast, present very 
low levels of harm, and some medical benefits.5 
Cannabis and tobacco distribution also differ in 
nature. The global tobacco market is heavily con-
centrated. China, Brazil, and India accounted for 
63% of all tobacco leaf cultivation in 2019 as part 
of a global cigarette market dominated by a small 
number of companies.6 China National Tobac-
co Corporation (CNTC) accounted for 43.9% of 
global cigarette retail volume in 2019 – the large 
majority of it is destined for domestic consump-
tion, though the company has been developing a 
global expansion strategy.7 Beyond CNTC, Philip 
Morris International (PMI) (13.4% of global retail 
volume in 2019), British American Tobacco (BAT) 
(12.7%), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) (9.1%) 
and Imperial Brands (4.2%) accounted for 70% 
of the rest of the world’s market share in 2019.8 
In contrast, cannabis can be grown indoors and 
therefore almost anywhere across the world. The 
illicit cannabis market has been characterised by 
a high number of small-scale growers, including 
for personal consumption and local distribution. 
Moreover, cigarettes are light, compact, distrib-
uted in small packs, and easy to smuggle – in part 
because they can be disguised as legal products 
through false invoicing and/or when hidden with-
in a shipment containing other commodities. One 
20-foot shipping container alone can hold almost
five million cigarettes.
Yet tobacco and cannabis are both plants with 
psychoactive substances, with some similar char-
acteristics including with regard to production 
(cultivation and processing) and consumption 
(tobacco and cannabis products can be smoked, 
consumed with a vaporiser, or used orally), and 
to some extent converging industries (see Box 1). 
In any jurisdiction that regulates a psychoac-
tive drug like tobacco or cannabis, a portion of 
it will remain on the illicit market. In Canada for 
instance, approximately half of the total canna-
bis market was illicit in the third quarter of 2020, 
almost two years after cannabis legalisation was 
introduced, according to expenditure data (see 
Figure 1). Across the 10 Canadian provinces, legal 
recreational cannabis shares varied from 13% to 
70% in September 2019.9 An estimated 10-12% 
of cigarettes consumed worldwide are illicit – this 
includes both illicit production and distribution.10 
Given those similarities and while the legal can-
nabis industry is still nascent, now is the time to 





Why would tobacco companies get 
involved in the cannabis industry?
Internal tobacco industry documents from the 
1970s shed light on early consideration from at 
least three major tobacco companies (PMI, BAT, 
and RJ Reynolds (RJR)) to manufacture cigarettes 
containing cannabis, as Barry et al (2014) out-
lined.11 In 1970, Philip Morris president George 
Weissman wrote to Philip Morris USA president 
Ross Millhiser: ‘While I am opposed to its [can-
nabis] use, I recognize that it may be legalized in 
the near future and put on some sort of restrict-
ed sale, if only to eliminate the criminal element. 
Thus, with these great auspices, we should be in 
a position to examine: 1. A potential competition, 
2. A possible product, 3. At this time, cooperate 
with the government’.12 The same year, Sir Charles 
Ellis, who served as principal adviser to both the 
BAT board of directors and the International Nar-
cotics Control Board, wrote in an internal BAT 
memo: ‘The proposed research can be started off 
very simply, it is just to do for “cannabis-loaded” 
cigarettes what has already been done for normal 
cigarettes… The starting point must be to learn 
how to produce in quantity cigarettes loaded uni-
formly with a known amount of either ground 
cannabis or dried and cut cannabis rag’.13
For decades, this convergence was not formal-
ised. As recently as 2014, a BAT statement not-
ed: ‘The 1970s were a long time ago (…) Today, 
we have no interest whatsoever in participating 
in the marijuana market’.14 However, in recent 
years, the tobacco industry has shown a renewed 
interested in the cannabis industry – see exam-
ples below. This might be explained by a number 
of factors, including: the emergence of legal can-
nabis regulation in various jurisdictions, includ-
ing in the United States and Canada, which led to 
new legislation and complex compliance require-
ments which the tobacco industry is well placed 
to navigate, and a nascent legal cannabis indus-
try which tobacco companies could now invest. 
More liberal cannabis policies have also been 
associated with reduced stigma around cannabis 
use.15 Other factors may include the products’ 
similarities, the possible combined use of tobac-
co and cannabis in roll-your-own cigarettes and 
e-cigarettes, and tobacco companies’ interest in 
alternatives to combustible cigarettes.16
Examples of recent forays by major 
tobacco companies into the cannabis 
industry:
Philip Morris International:
2016: Made a US$20 million investment in Syqe 
Medical, an Israeli manufacturer of medical can-
nabis vaporisers.17
Imperial Brands: 
2017: Invested in UK-based medical cannabis re-
search company Oxford Cannabinoid Technolo-
gies.18
2019: Bought 19.9% of Auxly Cannabis (for 
C$123.3 million or US$93.6 million at the time19), 
a Canadian company which ‘spans the cannabis 
supply chain, including upstream cultivation, 
midstream extraction and processing, and down-
stream distribution and sales’.20
Altria:
2018: Paid US$1.8 billion for a 45% stake in 
Cronos Group (a Canadian company – one of the 
‘Big Four’ in the cannabis industry along with 
Canopy Growth, Aurora Cannabis, and Tilray).21 
Altria, which the same year also paid US$12.8bn 
for a 35% in US-vaping company Juul, was par-
ticularly interested in Cronos’ research and de-
velopment centre in Israel, focused on vaping 
devices, providing both financial resources and 
Altria employees to support the research.22
2020: Filed two patent applications for vaporiser 
devices specifically designed for cannabis – the 
company also owns two other similar vaporiser 
patents acquired through a previous sale.23 
British American Tobacco:
2020: The company announced they were re-
searching CBD and THC flavourings for their 
e-cigarettes.24
2021: BAT started test-marketing a range of CBD 
products in Manchester, UK as part of company 
efforts to ‘go beyond nicotine’.25
2021: BAT announced it would buy a nearly 20% 
stake in Organigram, a Canadian cannabis pro-
ducer for US$ 175.8 million.26 A company state-
ment noted that ‘BAT will gain access to R&D 
technologies, product innovation and cannabis 
expertise, complementing BAT’s extensive plant-
based expertise and development capabilities’.27
Box 1  Convergence between the tobacco and cannabis industries
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inform cannabis regime design decisions. By tack-
ling these questions early, governments are more 
likely to be able to prevent the emergence of an 
industry capable of preventing, deflecting and 
undermining policies centred on public health, 
social justice, inclusive and equitable trade, and 
human rights.29 The tobacco experience is argua-
bly not a reason to refrain from regulating canna-
bis at all. Rather it serves as a cautionary tale of 
the difficulties to restrain private actors once they 
have become too powerful. The history of the il-
licit tobacco trade, and the role of the tobacco 
industry in both driving it and shaping responses 
to it, is particularly relevant in that regard. It will 
be the focus of this report.
Overview of the illicit tobacco 
trade
The illicit tobacco trade is largely dominated by 
transnational tobacco company (TTC) brands, 
manufactured legally then diverted to the illicit 
market somewhere along the supply chain. This 
can be done via large shipments, in a way that re-
quires direct involvement or complicity from major 
manufacturers and distributors (large-scale smug-
gling), or in smaller amounts (‘ant smuggling’).30 
Cigarettes manufactured by smaller tobacco com-
panies, including aspiring and emerging TTCs, 
have also been smuggled in ways mimicking the 
strategies and tactics of TTCs.31 In addition to the 
smuggling of major brands, the illicit tobacco trade 
includes ‘illicit whites’ – also called ‘cheap whites’, 
defined by the European Commission as ‘brands 
manufactured legitimately in one market, either 
taxed for local consumption or untaxed for export, 
and sold knowingly to traders who transport them 
to another country where the products are sold 
illegally without domestic duty paid’.32 Trademark 
owners of ‘illicit whites’ – which include TTCs – are 
registered in a range of countries including Chi-
na, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UK.33 
Cigarettes are also illegally manufactured in legal 
and illegal factories.34 Counterfeiting, i.e. produc-
ing cigarettes bearing a trademark without the 
approval of the trademark’s owner, accounts for a 
small fraction of the illicit tobacco trade, approxi-
mately 2% of illicit cigarettes seized worldwide in 
2015.35
Factors
A number of factors may explain the illicit tobac-
co trade. Differences in prices between differ-
ent jurisdictions can provide an initial incentive 
for smuggling, given the potential profits to be 
made.36 A significant portion of cigarette prices in-
deed include taxation, given that increasing taxes 
has proven to be one of the most effective ways 
to decrease cigarette consumption. (The WHO 
recommends cigarettes to be taxed at 75% of re-
tail price;37 a price increase of 10% has shown to 
be responsible for a 2.5-5% decrease in smoking 
prevalence,38 or as Jha & Peto (2014) estimated, 
‘tripling real cigarette prices would approximate-
ly halve cigarette consumption worldwide’39). 
This has led the tobacco industry to criticise tax 
increases, through direct lobbying, commentar-
ies in media outlets, and relying on front groups, 
astroturfs and other third parties to push for low-
er cigarette taxes40 – in addition to other industry 
strategies to avoid the impact of tax increases on 
profits.41 However, as independent research and 
reports by the WHO and the World Bank have 
pointed out, countries with high taxation levels 
in fact face lower levels of illicit tobacco trade.42 
This is partly explained by the fact that these 
countries have better institutional resources to 
deal with the issue.43
Other factors that have proved to be significant 
include geography (e.g., border regions with 
The term ‘illicit tobacco trade’ refers to the 
illicit trade in tobacco products, most nota-
bly cigarettes. The World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) Framework Convention on To-
bacco Control (FCTC) defines ‘illicit trade’ as 
‘any practice or conduct prohibited by law 
and which relates to production, shipment, 
receipt, possession, distribution, sale or pur-
chase including any practice or conduct in-
tended to facilitate such activity’. It is worth 
noting that the term ‘illicit’ may have a mor-
al connotation as well. In this report, we use 
the term ‘illicit trade’ to reflect the wide 
range of activities encompassed in the FCTC 
definition above, because it is used widely 
by scholars, NGOS, IGOs, and governments 
alike, and given it is arguably more nuanced 
and binary than ‘legal/illegal’.28
Box 2  Terminology and 
definition
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extensive illicit trade across borders), the pres-
ence of established illicit networks, corruption, 
local laws and enforcement levels, and last but 
not least industry involvement46 – as we will ex-
plore in greater detail in the next section.
Impacts
A relatively small proportion of a regulated drug 
market being illicit may not initially seem like a 
significant problem. However, the illicit tobacco 
trade has a number of negative consequences. Il-
licit cigarettes tend to be cheaper and more read-
ily available via informal sales networks amongst 
vulnerable populations, e.g., younger people, 
thereby leading to more smoking and related 
morbidity and mortality.47 This is yet another 
pressure on already burdened public health sys-
tems. It also means lower tax revenue for govern-
ment and therefore weaker institutional capacity 
to address tobacco-related challenges. The illicit 
tobacco trade can also present an opportunity for 
the tobacco industry to pressure governments to 
decrease taxes and abandon other tobacco con-
trol measures, including plain packaging – despite 
independent evidence indicating that these are 
effective in reducing smoking and related harms.48 
Paradoxically, while TTCs have historically been 
involved in the illicit tobacco trade, they are now 
multiplying efforts to rebrand themselves as part-
ners to authorities as a way to increase their in-
fluence over other tobacco control policies. This 
is despite the WHO’s repeated warning of the 
‘fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between 
the tobacco industry’s interests and public health 
policy interests’ and the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 5.3 ‘to protect 
these policies from commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry’.49 In a way, TTCs 
have used the illicit tobacco trade as way to solid-
ify their power and influence.
The tobacco industry and the illicit 
tobacco trade
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, millions of in-
ternal TTC documents were publicly released as a 
result of legal settlements. A number of US states 
had sued TTCs to recover health care expendi-
ture.50 One of the most stunning revelations from 
these documents was that TTCs had relied on the 
illicit tobacco trade as part of their business strat-
egies since at least the 1960s.51 
Why would tobacco companies get 
involved in the illicit tobacco trade? 
TTCs have benefited from the illicit tobacco trade 
in a number of ways. Tobacco manufacturers are 
paid when their products are sent to wholesale 
distributors, regardless of whether products are 
then channelled through the legal supply chain 
or diverted to the illicit market. A February 2000 
internal BAT briefing on how to deal with smug-
gling allegations noted that ‘where necessary, 
British American Tobacco acts, within the law, on 
the basis that its brands will be found available 
alongside those of its competitors in the smug-
gled as well as the legitimate market’, and that 
the company ‘had no control over what became 
of its cigarettes after it sold them’.52            
In fact, illicit cigarettes tend to be cheaper (giv-
en that no taxes or lower taxes from another ju-






















for non-medical use 
(licensed)
--- 170 301 372 422 475 558 648 824
Cannabis product 
for non-medical use 
(unlicensed)
1,306 1,187 1,021 962 916 871 824 785 754
Total non-medical use 1,306 1,357 1,322 1,334 1,338 1,346 1,382 1,433 1,578
% of unlicensed (black 
market)
100% 87% 77% 72% 68% 65% 60% 55% 48%
Figure 1. Detailed household final consumption expenditure on non-medical cannabis products, 
quarterly, Canada (in million C$44)
Source: Based on data from Statistics Canada45
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usually lead to more sales and profit. The circu-
lation of these smuggled cigarettes also helps 
create smoking habits and brand loyalty amongst 
younger populations, an additional long-term ad-
vantage for the industry.
TTCs have also used the illicit tobacco trade, 
which they have themselves been involved in, as 
an opportunity to lobby governments against tax 
increases and other tobacco control measures. 
In Canada, between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s, several tobacco companies legally shipped 
their cigarettes to the United States for them to 
be smuggled back to Canada via Indigenous re-
serves, evading Canadian excise taxes.53 In paral-
lel, these companies pointed to this increase in 
the illicit tobacco trade to lobby the federal gov-
ernment to reduce cigarette taxes. The success-
ful lobbying efforts led to tens of thousands of 
additional smoking-related deaths in Canada.54,55 
More recently, tobacco companies have fought 
against the introduction of plain packaging (also 
called standardised packaging), including in Aus-
tralia, Canada, the UK, and Uruguay, arguing that 
this will lead to dramatic increases in illicit trade. 
This claim has been repeatedly debunked.56 
Internal tobacco industry documents revealed 
that cigarette smuggling was in fact part of tobac-
co companies’ market entry strategy from at least 
the 1960s onwards. At the time, US tobacco com-
panies began to anticipate a domestic decline in 
smoking given the emergence of scientific evi-
dence on the health harms caused by cigarettes 
– including the 1964 US General Surgeon report 
linking smoking to lung cancer.57 Though the de-
cline in demand did not materialise for decades, 
these companies started to aggressively target 
overseas markets around that time.58 Many of 
them were protected by import restrictions, high 
tariffs, and other barriers that made any legal 
entry particularly challenging. Tobacco company 
executives therefore decided to smuggle their 
cigarettes to those protected markets to create 
demand for these products, while pressuring lo-
cal governments to open up their countries to 
foreign imports and investment. The strategy was 
particularly effective in Latin America, where Par-
aguay served as a transit hub, through which cig-
arettes were legally exported for them to be then 
smuggled to the attractive yet closed markets 
of Argentina and Brazil.59 Local companies were 
then progressively bought off, eventually leading 
to a near duopoly across South America, where 
TTC BAT and PMI account for 89.7% of the con-
tinent’s cigarette market share – with only three 
countries (Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay) where 
a local company dominates the market.60 
Growing market share has been another objec-
tive of TTC involvement in the illicit tobacco trade. 
Numerous internal BAT documents, for instance, 
point in that direction, including communication 
from company directors advising BAT directors 
prior to a UK parliamentary hearing in 2005: ‘DNP 
[duty not paid] (…) does connote smuggled goods 
(…) The evidence is it [BAT] used DNP channels to 
grow its market share [in Latin America]’.61 
One other justification tobacco company execu-
tives have expressed is that tobacco companies 
merely do what everyone else around them does. 
A 1992 internal BAT document on northeast Ar-
gentina notes ‘DNP cigarettes are a fact of life and 
almost institutionalized’.62 
Generally, the illicit tobacco trade presents to-
bacco companies with low risks and high re-
wards. Price differentials between jurisdictions 
mean great potential for substantial profits, while 
only a handful of often low- to mid-level tobacco 
company executives have been incarcerated for 
smuggling activities.63 
How have tobacco companies smuggled 
their products? 
Historically, tobacco companies relied on a number 
of tactics to smuggle their cigarettes. Internal doc-
uments released in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
– and related lawsuits and investigations (see Box 
3) – demonstrate that these notably included:  
• Oversupplying markets: TTCs have legally 
shipped vast amounts of cigarettes to coun-
tries – at times referred to as transit hubs – 
with very small domestic markets and limit-
ed legal exports. Those cigarettes were then 
smuggled to other destinations. Paraguay (a 
scheme led by BAT and PMI from the 1960s to 
the 1980s), Andorra (Gallaher, mid-1990s),64 
Belgium (US tobacco companies, late 1990s)65 
are amongst the most well-known examples. 
• Overproduction: Similarly, in certain countries, 
tobacco companies have manufactured more 
6
cigarettes than the domestic consumption and 
legal exports could account for, with products 
being then diverted to the illicit trade. Exten-
sive evidence indicates that Tabacalera del 
Este, most commonly known as Tabesa, one of 
the largest companies in Paraguay and led by 
former President Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), 
has relied on such a scheme.71 In 2015 for in-
stance, Tabesa produced an estimated 25-36 
billion cigarettes, while Paraguay’s domestic 
consumption and legal exports respective-
ly amounted to 4 billion and 2.1 billion ciga-
rettes.72       
• Smuggling through transit hubs: By shipping to 
countries and jurisdictions with low regulation 
and enforcement, including Free Trade Zones 
like the Colón Free Zone in Panama, Aruba, or 
Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) in the UAE, tobacco 
companies have managed to divert cigarettes 
from their legal supply chains to the illicit mar-
ket.76 Reforming Free Trade Zones to discour-
age smuggling is extremely difficult given the 
de-regulated nature of these zones. 
• Round tripping: This is the phenomenon 
whereby a cigarette shipment is legal-
ly manufactured and exported excise-free 
from country X to country Y for it to be then 
smuggled back to country X, thereby evad-
ing taxes.77 The aforementioned example of 
Andorra fits this, with Gallaher cigarettes 
being legally shipped from the UK to Andor-
ra before being smuggled back to the UK.78 
• Relying on distributors: In order to keep some 
distance with illicit activities, tobacco manufac-
turers have historically relied on wholesale dis-
tributors and other intermediaries to carry out 
the smuggling for them. By doing so, they have 
been able to keep smugglers ‘at arm’s length’, as 
described in a 1988 internal BAT document on 
Sorepex, a major distributor of BAT cigarettes 
in Africa.79 Tobacco manufacturers have then 
countered smuggling allegations by claims that 
they sold their cigarettes to legitimate distrib-
utors and that what happened afterwards was 
not their responsibility. Tabesa CEO José Ortiz 
for instance noted in a 2009 interview with Par-
aguayan newspaper ABC Color: ‘We have the 
function of supplying the market (…) We have 
no way of knowing where our cigarettes are 
smoked, nor is it our problem’.80 
• A UK Parliamentary inquiry into BAT’s 
alleged smuggling activities66 following 
extensive reports by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists,67 
which later led to a formal investigation 
by the UK Department of Trade and In-
dustry.68
• The Government of Canada suing RJ Reyn-
olds, related entities, and the Canadian 
Tobacco Manufacturers Council in US fed-
eral court for smuggling cigarettes across 
the US-Canada border.69
• A lawsuit filed by 22 Colombian governors 
and the city of Bogota against Philip Mor-
ris, and later British American Tobacco for 
cigarette smuggling, money laundering, 
wire fraud, and mail fraud – later consol-
idated when the then European Commu-
nity joined the lawsuit, claiming the com-
panies conspired to smuggle cigarettes 
to Europe and laundered the proceeds of 
drug trafficking.70 
• A civil RICO suit filed by the Government 
of Ecuador in Miami-Dade Circuit Court 
against Philip Morris, BAT and RJR.71
• The European Community and 26 mem-
ber states filing a RICO civil suit in the 
United States against RJR, JTI, and PMI, 
claiming the companies participated in a 
global money laundering scheme in coop-
eration with organised crime groups.72 
These lawsuits and inquiries notably led to 
settlements, guilty verdicts, and agreements 
between TTCs and national and internation-
al authorities to address the illicit tobacco 
trade.73  
Box 3  Examples of late 1990s/
early 2000s lawsuits and 
formal inquiries focusing 
on transnational tobacco 
companies’ role in smuggling
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Policy responses 
Following the release of internal tobacco industry 
documents shedding light on the manipulative 
tactics deployed for decades – including its in-
volvement in the illicit trade – a number of policy 
responses were introduced at the national and 
international levels, chiefly: the WHO’s FCTC and 
later on its Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in To-
bacco Products (Protocol), and a series of Mem-
oranda of Understanding and other agreements 
between tobacco companies and national govern-
ments as well as the European Union (EU). 
The WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control 
Throughout the 1990s, TTCs faced a number of 
lawsuits not only for their involvement in smug-
gling, but primarily for the harms caused by their 
products and the lies and other deceitful tactics 
they had used to continue to grow profits and ex-
pand their business globally.82 Meanwhile, tobac-
co killed 3.5 million people worldwide in 1998, 
and was expected to cause at least 10 million 
deaths a year by 2030, with 70% of them in lower- 
and middle-income countries, if significant steps 
were not taken.83 Dr. Ruth Roemer, University of 
California, Los Angeles School of Public Health 
professor and University of Maryland law profes-
sor Dr. Allyn Taylor were involved in the inception 
of the idea of an international treaty on tobac-
co. In 1995, based on Taylor’s concept ‘that the 
WHO should utilize its constitutional authority 
to develop international conventions to advance 
global health’, Roemer and Taylor wrote a docu-
ment on its feasibility, which recommended the 
framework convention approach. This ultimately 
led to the development, creation, and adoption 
of the WHO FCTC.84 The FCTC was eventually 
adopted by the World Health Assembly on 21 
May 2003 and entered into force on 27 February 
2005 (see key provisions in Box 4).85 
Overall, academic studies on the impacts of the 
FCTC have emphasised that though key meas-
ures put forward by the FCTC (e.g., increases in 
taxes, protection from tobacco smoke, health 
warnings, cessation aid, and bans on tobacco 
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship) have 
led to a decrease in smoking prevalence, pro-
gress has been ‘too small, too slow, and une-
ven’.86Smoking rates across 126 countries exam-
ined in one study only went down from 24.7% in 
2005 to 22.2% in 2015.87 
Beyond demand-reduction and supply-control 
measures per se, the Impact Assessment Expert 
Group found that over its first decade, the FCTC 
had notably contributed to ‘significant and rapid 
progress in the implementation’ of comprehen-
sive smoke-free laws for indoor workplaces, res-
taurants and bars (Article 8),85 thereby reducing 
second-hand smoke-related harms, and of bans 
on sales of tobacco products to and by minors 
(Article 16). ‘Significant gaps remain’, however, in 
the implementation and evaluation of measures 
to regulate the contents and emissions of tobac-
co products (Article 9), to promote economical-
ly viable alternatives to tobacco farming (Article 
17), and to address the health and environmen-
tal impacts related to the cultivation and manu-
facture of tobacco (Article 18).89 
 
Demand reduction (articles 6-14):
• Price and tax measures 
• Non-price measures, including: 
 - Protection from exposure to tobacco 
smoke
 - Regulation of the contents of tobacco 
products
 - Regulation of tobacco product disclo-
sures
 - Packaging and labelling of tobacco 
products 
 - Education, communication, training 
and public awareness
 - Tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship
 - Demand reduction measures concern-
ing tobacco dependence and cessation.
Supply reduction (articles 15-17):
• Illicit trade in tobacco products 
• Sales to and by minors
• Provision of support for economically via-
ble alternative activities.
Box 4  Key provisions of the 
WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control81
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The FCTC’s challenges largely stem from weak 
compliance mechanisms, inadequate resources 
and an insufficient focus on implementing effec-
tive pro-health tobacco control measures at the 
national level, with tobacco industry interference 
playing a major blocking role.92,93 By 2011, six 
years after the adoption of the FCTC, only US$68 
million of the US$31.4 billion spent in develop-
ment assistance for global health was focused on 
tobacco control, even though tobacco remained 
the second leading cause of death worldwide.94
Article 5.3 of the FCTC, along with its Guidelines 
for implementation, focuses on guarding against 
tobacco industry interference in policy making 
(Box 5).95,96 This is a cornerstone of the FCTC, giv-
en the industry’s history in misleading consumers 
about the harms their products pose, and their 
sophisticated strategies to shape policies in a way 
that would benefit their commercial interests at 
the expense of public health. However, Fooks 
et al (2017) point out: ‘Across all Parties, 16% of 
guideline recommendations reviewed have been 
implemented. Eighty-three percent of Parties 
that have taken some action under Article 5.3 
have introduced less than a third of the guide-
lines’.97 Similarly, Hawkins & Holden (2018) found 
that ‘Article 5.3 compliance within EU institutions 
is partial and incomplete’, pointing to ‘wide-
spread lack of knowledge about the existence 
of the FCTC and Article 5.3 amongst key policy 
actors across the institutions’, and ‘considerable 
resistance in [the European Parliament and the 
European Commission] to further substantive ac-
tion to implement Article 5.3’, noting that tobac-
co industry officials effectively bypassed health 
officials to lobby other EU representatives across 
related issues.98 Other studies have shown that 
non-health ministries in many countries (includ-
ing in India,99 and Mexico100 and South Korea101) 
have also been particularly vulnerable to tobac-
co industry interference, including through cor-
porate social responsibility initiatives and front 
groups.102 The ‘PMI Files’, published by Reuters in 
2017, revealed the company’s strategy to subvert 
and undermine the implementation of the FCTC 
by targeting officials in trade, finance, agriculture 
and other non-health ministries less familiar with 
the tobacco industry’s strategies and tactics.103 
It is also worth noting that the FCTC focused on 
domestic tobacco control measures – including 
requiring countries to implement bans on smok-
ing in public places and restrictions on tobacco 
advertising and labelling, and encouraging (i.e. 
not mandating) parties to increase taxes on to-
bacco products. As Bollyky and Fidler (2015) point 
out, ‘It contains no obligations concerning licit 
international trade and investment, cross-border 
advertising, assistance for developing countries, 
or strong dispute settlement’.104 
 
Text:
‘In setting and implementing their public 
health policies with respect to tobacco con-
trol, Parties shall act to protect these policies 
from commercial and other vested interests 
of the tobacco industry in accordance with 
national law’.90
WHO recommendations for 
implementation:
1. Raise awareness about the addictive and 
harmful nature of tobacco products and 
about tobacco industry interference with 
Parties’ tobacco control policies.
2. Establish measures to limit interactions 
with the tobacco industry and ensure the 
transparency of those interactions that 
occur.
3. Reject partnerships and non-binding or 
non-enforceable agreements with the to-
bacco industry.
4. Avoid conflicts of interest for government 
officials and employees.
5. Require that information provided by the 
tobacco industry be transparent and accu-
rate.
6. De-normalise and, to the extent possible, 
regulate activities described as ‘socially 
responsible’ by the tobacco industry, in-
cluding but not limited to activities de-
scribed as ‘corporate social responsibility’.
7. Do not give preferential treatment to the 
tobacco industry.
8. Treat State-owned tobacco industry in the 
same way as any other tobacco industry.91
Box 5  Article 5.3 of the WHO 
Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control
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Ultimately, the FCTC helped create a set of largely 
effective rules for domestic tobacco control, in-
cluding tax increases, public smoking bans, and 
advertising restrictions, though given the nature 
of international treaties, the actual treaty text 
was watered down during negotiations. The first 
15 years of the FCTC also demonstrate the impor-
tance of civil society groups, including Bloomberg 
Philanthropies and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation, in supporting those efforts, particularly in 
low- and middle-income countries where most to-
bacco-related deaths are feared to occur.105      
The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in 
Tobacco Products
Article 15 of the FCTC focused on the illicit trade in 
tobacco products, notably including measures on 
marking products to help authorities determine 
their origin and point of diversion to the illicit mar-
ket, data monitoring and collection, enacting and 
strengthening legislation, considering a tracking 
and tracing regime, and putting in place further 
measures to control or regulate production and 
distribution, including through licensing.106 
Building on Article 15, and two years after the 
adoption of the FCTC, in 2015 the second FCTC 
Conference of the Parties established an Intergov-
ernmental Negotiating Body to draft and negotiate 
an FCTC protocol specifically dedicated to the illicit 
tobacco trade. Following years of drafting and ne-
gotiations, the Protocol was adopted in November 
2012 and entered into force in September 2018 – 
with 62 parties to date (as of 15 March 2021), a 
process which contrasted with that of the FCTC, 
adopted and ratified far more swiftly and widely. 
The stated objective of the Protocol is the ‘elim-
ination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco 
products’.107 General obligations (Article 4 of the 
Protocol) notably include taking measures to in-
crease the effectiveness of competent authori-
ties and services, improve technical assistance, 
financial support, capacity building and interna-
tional cooperation, and most importantly control 
and regulate the supply chain of tobacco prod-
ucts, including through licensing, due diligence, 
and a global tracking and tracing regime (to be 
established by September 2023 – Article 8).
The Protocol clearly warns against tobacco indus-
try interference in efforts by national and inter-
national authorities to combat the illicit tobacco 
trade. Its preamble, citing FCTC Article 5.3, em-
phasises ‘the need to be alert to any efforts by 
the tobacco industry to undermine or subvert 
strategies to combat illicit trade in tobacco prod-
ucts and the need to be informed of activities of 
the tobacco industry that have a negative impact 
on strategies to combat illicit trade in tobacco 
products’.108 Article 4 of the Protocol stipulates: 
‘In implementing their obligations under this Pro-
tocol, Parties shall ensure the maximum possible 
transparency with respect to any interactions 
they may have with the tobacco industry’.109 Ar-
ticle 8 on tracking and tracing specifically points 
out that obligations ‘shall not be performed by 
or delegated to the tobacco industry’ and that 
interactions with the tobacco industry and affili-
ates shall be kept ‘to the extent strictly necessary 
in the implementation of this Article’.110
The Protocol only entered into force in September 
2018, and a relatively small number of countries 
have so far ratified it. Though it might be too ear-
ly to draw definitive conclusions, implementation 
to date has been problematic. Even before the 
adoption of the Protocol, Liberman et al (2011) 
cautioned that government cooperation with 
the tobacco industry in combating the illicit trade 
‘poses risks for tobacco control, particularly if re-
lationships and norms of cooperation spill over 
into other areas of FCTC implementation’, high-
lighting that the industry saw it ‘as an opportunity 
to portray itself as “legitimate” and “responsible”, 
a friend of governments, and a way to integrate 
itself into FCTC processes’.111 The authors correct-
ly predicted, ‘it is likely that the tobacco industry 
stands ready to provide funding to governments to 
“work together” on protocol implementation’.112
Although the FCTC and Protocol were in part in-
itially intended to hold the industry to account 
– including for its role in smuggling, the tobacco 
industry has deployed a sophisticated strategy to 
become part and parcel of the international policy 
response to the illicit tobacco trade, amidst grow-
ing evidence of its continued involvement therein.
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Corporate capture: Tobacco 
industry’s growing influence on 
governments’ anti-illicit trade 
response
Since the early 2000s, TTCs have striven to re-
brand themselves from ‘pariah’ to ‘victim and 
solution’ of the illicit tobacco trade.113 Follow-
ing the aforementioned lawsuits, the four major 
TTCs signed legal agreements with the EU be-
tween 2004 and 2010, along with financial pay-
ments totalling US$1.9 billion over 20 years and 
supplementary seizure payments of 100% of the 
evaded taxes in the events of seizures of their 
cigarettes.114 Joossens et al (2016) noted that 
these agreements, though intended to hold the 
industry to account for their role in the illicit to-
bacco trade, have instead established ‘extensive 
systems of cooperation’, ‘have served largely to 
secure the TTCs’ interests and are threatening 
progress in tobacco control’.115 The agreements 
are thus arguably in breach of the spirit of FCTC 
Article 5.3, have enhanced TTCs’ credibility 
worldwide as a partner to the EU, and have not 
been effective at reducing the size of illicit tobac-
co markets: Between 2004 and 2012, TTC seizure 
payments amounted to an estimated 0.08% of 
the revenue losses to the illicit tobacco trade.116
Similarly, TTCs signed Memoranda of Under-
standing (MOU) with governments to tackle the 
illicit tobacco trade – at least 124 such MOU be-
tween 1998 and 2014.114 In contrast to the legal-
ly-binding EU agreements, these are voluntary, 
non-enforceable, and largely opaque partner-
ships. Yet just like the EU agreements, they have 
been largely ineffective at mitigating the illicit 
tobacco trade118 and served as an opportunity 
for TTCs to shape law enforcement strategies 
against the illicit activities in which they continue 
to be complicit.
As part of these agreements, more informal ar-
rangements, and implementation of the Protocol, 
TTCs have become an increasingly central part 
of the policy response against the illicit tobacco 
trade, providing equipment, training, financial 
support, information and intelligence, and other 
types of assistance to governments – including to 
revenue, customs and law enforcement agencies 
– to tackle the illicit tobacco trade.119 
TTCs have also put in place a sophisticated strat-
egy to undermine the creation and implementa-
tion of a global track-and-trace regime – argua-
bly the most central measure put forward by 
the Protocol. PMI initially developed Codentify, 
a product serialisation and pack market system 
allegedly able to ‘track & trace products at all 
packaging levels from manufacturing throughout 
the supply chain’.120 The technology, later shared 
with the other three major TTCs and now named 
Inexto, has drawn widespread criticism. Despite 
claims of independence from the tobacco indus-
try, it continues to be controlled by the industry 
– it is notably designed in a way to keep control 
amongst manufacturers (not independent reg-
ulators); key Inexto officials previously worked 
for PMI and other TTCs; and leaked documents 
showed continued cooperation between Inexto 
and TTCs long after the companies claimed they 
stopped working together.121 Codentify/Inexto 
has also been criticised for its ineffectiveness, 
inefficiency (requiring a lot more resources from 
law enforcement than other track-and-trace solu-
tions), and opacity.122 
By funding and commissioning research on the 
illicit tobacco trade, TTCs have also been able 
to shape the public and policy discourse on the 
matter. Gallagher et al (2019) found that studies 
funded by the tobacco industry routinely exag-
gerate the scale of illicit tobacco markets.123 The 
authors notably highlight ‘inappropriate usage 
of methods of data collection and data analysis, 
misleading presentation of results and a lack of 
transparency throughout, with information nec-
essary for replication often being excluded’.124 
Through its PMI IMPACT programme launched in 
2016, PMI has also been funding research on the 
illicit trade and related crimes.125 PMI committed 
to provide $US100 million through its first three 
rounds of grants ‘to support public, private, and 
non-governmental organizations to develop and 
implement projects’.126 The two rounds of grant-
ees awarded so far include funded projects on the 
links between the illicit tobacco trade, terrorism 
and organised crime, money laundering, wildlife 
trafficking, illicit trade in other commodities in-
cluding alcohol and fuel, migration, human rights 
and corruption.127 Though PMI IMPACT does not 
seem to be involved in the projects’ research or 
writing process, none of 61 projects funded to 
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date focus on the role the tobacco industry has 
been playing in the illicit tobacco trade, nor, of 
course, does it fund organisations with a history 
of holding TTCs to account. This type of funding 
helps PMI pursue its reputational interests by se-
lecting projects that, together, may give the mis-
leading impression that the illicit tobacco trade 
is a problem which is largely characterised by or-
ganised crime groups and terrorist organisations, 
while simultaneously helping the company im-
prove its corporate image.128 
As part of their engagement strategy on the illicit 
tobacco trade, TTCs have also managed to influ-
ence media reporting on the issue. Smith et al 
(2017) found that ‘organizations with ties to the 
tobacco industry are often quoted in media re-
ports about the illicit trade and, through the me-
dia, promote policy responses that favour the in-
dustry’.129 In these stories, the illicit tobacco trade 
is notably ‘portrayed as a safety and security is-
sue, linked to the activities of organized crime, 
and even terrorism’, and that it is ‘caused by 
excessively high tobacco taxation, pushing con-
sumers to seek cheaper alternatives, and strict 
regulations of tobacco products, which punish 
legitimate businesses’, though independent re-
search suggests otherwise.130 Altria, PMI, Reyn-
olds America, and the PMI-funded Foundation 
for a Smoke Free World have also donated to the 
Influence Foundation,131 which runs Filter Mag, 
a magazine whose stated ‘mission is to advocate 
through journalism for rational and compassion-
ate approaches to drug use, drug policy and hu-
man rights’.132 A number of Filter Mag articles ar-
gue that greater regulation on tobacco products 
will lead to more smuggling.133
TTCs have relied on free-market and libertarian 
think tanks to argue against effective tobacco 
control measures, e.g., tax increases and plain 
packaging, pushed for new products promoted 
by the industry, and disseminated industry-fund-
ed academic research, notably claiming that fur-
ther regulation will automatically lead to more 
illicit trade.134
Partnerships with a number of international gov-
ernmental organisations (including Interpol135 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD)136) and discreet 
lobbying through front groups, astroturfs and 
other third parties137 have been other key tac-
tics tobacco companies have used to influence 
perceptions on the illicit tobacco trade, and ce-
ment the industry’s role as part and parcel of the 
policy response.
Continued tobacco industry 
involvement in the illicit trade 
Amidst this corporate capture of the discourse 
and policies on the illicit tobacco trade, cigarettes 
manufactured legally by TTCs continue to account 
for the large majority of the illicit trade, with var-
ious seizure data at the European and interna-
tional levels estimating it at 60-70%.138,139 While 
there have been multiple reports of illicit ciga-
rette production and trade carried out by organ-
ised crime groups, smaller gangs, and even some 
involvement of terrorist groups, TTCs continue to 
hold much greater manufacturing capacity, and 
at the very least have been unwilling or unable to 
effectively control their supply chains.140 A recent 
investigation by the Dutch tax authorities led to 
the uncovering of one of the largest illicit ciga-
rette factories in the country’s history: 3.6 million 
cigarettes were seized along with 32,000 kilos of 
tobacco, packaging material, cigarette paper, and 
cigarette filters.141 An estimated 38.5 million cig-
arettes can be produced with that amount of to-
bacco, according to Corradini’s (2010)’s method-
ology.142,143 These numbers may seem staggering, 
but a single PMI machine can produce up to 1.2 
million cigarettes per hour,144 while 5.7 trillion cig-
arettes were sold worldwide in 2016.145
A series of serious allegations have been made in 
recent years on continued TTC involvement in the 
illicit tobacco trade. These include:
Japan Tobacco International 
• In 2011, an Organised Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project (OCCRP) investigation, based 
on company emails and other internal doc-
uments, detailed claims of JTI’s complicity in 
cigarette smuggling across several regions, in-
cluding ‘through Russia, Moldova, the Balkans, 
Afghanistan and the Middle East’ – when inter-
nal investigators presented information inter-
nally, a senior JTI executive blocked the inves-
tigation.146Internal BAT documents claim that 
JTI facilitated illicit trade into the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.147
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British American Tobacco 
• In 2016, BAT was fined for oversupplying hand-
rolled tobacco to Belgium, which was later 
smuggled back to the UK.148, 149
• Other internal documents leaked by a whis-
tle-blower at BAT show that: the company il-
legally moved millions of dollars of cash from 
Uganda to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to buy tobacco leaf then smuggled to Kenya 
and Uganda; BAT cigarettes were diverted to 
the illicit market across Africa, the Middle East 
and Europe.150
• An OCCRP investigation published in February 
2021 found that the profits of billions of smug-
gled cigarettes, most of them produced by 
BAT in South Africa, ‘fuel the bloody struggle 
between jihadists, armed militias, and corrupt 
military officers’ in Northern Mali.151
Philip Morris International 
• A lawsuit filed in November 2020 accuses PMI 
of smuggling cigarettes across Africa and the 
Middle East through a UAE-based distributor 
until at least 2010. In addition, it claims that PMI 
continues to overproduce cigarettes in Algeria 
and oversupply the local market for diversion to 
illicit markets in Europe, particularly France. The 
lawsuit also alleges that PMI stole the claimant’s 
Empty Pack Survey methodology, designed to 
estimate the size of illicit tobacco markets, and 
manipulates it to ‘deflect attention from PMI’s 
misdeeds’, ‘target certain “illicit competitors”’, 
and ‘lobby against taxes’. Data indicating that in 
the third quarter of 2019 ‘over 20% of the total 
French market (legal or otherwise) was com-
posed of untaxed PMI products’ was notably 
excluded from a PMI-funded report by KPMG 
using Empty Pack Survey methodology.152
• In February 2021, OCCRP revealed that PMI 
continues to rely on one of the richest men in 
Burkina Faso, well known for his smuggling ac-
tivities, to distribute cigarettes across West and 
North Africa.153
Trends in the emerging cannabis 
industry 
Tobacco industry tactics regarding the illicit to-
bacco trade – including extensively cooperat-
ing with law enforcement, undermining track-
and-trace systems, funding and commissioning 
research on the illicit trade, shaping media sto-
ries on the topic, engaging with national govern-
ments, international governmental organisations 
and other third parties, and lobbying for lower 
taxes and the targeting of competitors while con-
tinuing to be complicit in smuggling – could very 
well be replicated in the legal cannabis industry, 
unless stronger accountability mechanisms are 
put in place. The case of Canada, the first coun-
try to regulate the cannabis supply chain through 
a largely commercial model (in contrast with the 
stricter, nationalised model designed by Uru-
guay), offers some warning signs.
The legal cannabis industry is at a nascent stage, 
but two main developments are worth monitoring 
closely due to their resemblance to tobacco indus-
try tactics. A 2020 report by Transform and Méxi-
co Unido Contra la Delicuencia pointed out, ‘The 
dynamics of corporate capture and related distor-
tions of the policymaking process (of the kind seen 
especially in the alcohol and tobacco industry) are 
a significant and pressing concern, and one that 
has not been diminished by significant investment 
from alcohol and tobacco corporations in the Ca-
nadian cannabis sector’154 (see Box 1).
First, lobbying for lower taxes and against further 
regulation, and pushing for more law enforcement 
against smaller competitors. The Canadian indus-
try is already highly concentrated around a small 
number of manufacturers, i.e., Canopy Growth, 
the Cronos Group, Aurora Cannabis, and Tilray – 
the so-called ‘Big Four’. The four companies are all 
represented on the board of the Cannabis Council 
of Canada, which aims ‘to act as the national voice 
for our members in their promotion of industry 
standards’.155 The Cannabis Council of Canada has 
notably argued against the introduction of new 
regulations (including limits on THC levels and a 
ban on edibles in Quebec151) and, specifically on 
the illicit cannabis trade, in favour of lowering tax-
es and increasing enforcement (‘we recommend 
that the government prioritize the closure and 
removal of both illegal brick and mortar stores, 
and actively seek out and shut down illegal on-
line cannabis dispensaries’, the council noted in 
a November 2019 letter to Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau).157 Meanwhile, Altria, a major tobacco 
company which acquired 45% of Cronos in 2018 
(see Box 1), is actively lobbying the U.S. Congress 
for legislation friendly to the industry.158
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Second, funding research. Though there is no 
record of cannabis companies funding research 
on the illicit cannabis trade to date, there have 
already been significant grants and donations 
awarded by various cannabis companies to oth-
er areas of academic research. These include:159 
Canopy Growth donating C$2.5 million (at the 
time US$1.9 million160) to the University of Brit-
ish Columbia and the British Columbia Centre on 
Substance Use for research on the use of cannabis 
to address the opioid overdose crisis and launch-
ing the Canopy Growth Cannabis Science Endow-
ment Fund and the Canopy Growth Professor of 
Cannabis Science in 2018,161 and an undisclosed 
amount to the Fondation de l’Hôpital du Sacré-
Coeur de Montréal and the Canadian Sleep and 
Circadian Network in 2019;162 Cronos funding the 
Technion Research and Development Foundation 
to study the use of cannabis in skin disorders in 
2018;163 and Tilray donating to the University of 
British Columbia for a clinical trial on cannabis 
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 2016.164
Similarly, serious concerns, notably raised by Jels-
ma, Kay & Bewley-Taylor (2019), exist regarding 
the ‘threatened exclusion of small-scale and mar-
ginalised farmers from traditional cannabis pro-
ducer countries in the Global South’.165 Though 
they do not directly relate to the illicit trade, 
these developments are part of a broader story 
of exploitation. An agricultural history of cannabis 
in Africa shows that ‘Global Northerners [contin-
ue] to extract more value from African resources 
than African farmers can extract’.166 While tobac-
co leaf production has shifted from high-income 
countries to upper-middle income, lower-mid-
dle income and low-income countries since the 
early 2000s, tobacco farming has been largely 
marked by child labour, poverty, exploitation by 
global companies, and deforestation and other 
forms of environmental degradation, in contrast 
with tobacco industry public messaging on the 
matter.167 This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
colonial and racist origins and current activities 
of TTCs.168 Several Canadian cannabis companies 
have already invested in medical cannabis culti-
vation around the world, notably in Colombia and 
Jamaica, where the ‘autonomous participation of 
small farmers in the market continues to be un-
dermined by a range of complex factors’.169 
Conclusion: Ten implications for 
legal cannabis regulation
TTCs have been complicit and directly involved 
in the illicit tobacco trade through various tac-
tics explored in this briefing paper. In parallel, 
they have managed to shape policy responses 
to it through overt and covert engagement with 
the media, academia, law enforcement, interna-
tional governmental organisations, international 
treaties, and front groups. As the legal cannabis 
industry continues to expand, and new jurisdic-
tions review regulatory frameworks for cannabis 
supply chains, this briefing paper offered an over-
view of industry strategies and practices to watch 
out for on illicit trade issues. Ten overall lessons 
are worth stressing here:
1. Consider home-growing and other 
non-profit models170 
These models would serve as useful alterna-
tives to commercial frameworks, which in the 
case of tobacco have led to harmful effects and 
provided economic incentives for smuggling. 
2. Ensure that policies and enforcement 
practices centre on public health, 
social justice, human rights, and 
equitable and inclusive trade
Regulatory frameworks should notably em-
power communities affected by cannabis pro-
hibition, and feature strong environmental 
standards, labour protection, and inclusive 
and democratic models.171 Importantly, re-
quirements on preventing the illicit trade that 
are too rigid or expensive may effectively limit 
or exclude participation from smaller manu-
facturers or farming cooperatives. 
3. Fund independent academic research 
and analysis on the illicit cannabis 
trade in regulated economies
Though the illicit cannabis trade in a regulat-
ed economy may look different from the illicit 
tobacco trade, independent research on the 
topic will prove essential in informing future 
policies. Methodologies used to estimate the 
size of illicit cigarette markets172 and monitor 
tobacco industry activity173 could prove par-
ticularly useful in that regard.
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4. Establish comprehensive and 
adequately funded monitoring 
mechanisms
Finding innovative ways to monitor the il-
licit cannabis trade beyond traditional law 
enforcement and interdiction is another im-
portant point of consideration for cannabis 
regulation. Independent data collection and 
analysis throughout supply chains, for in-
stance, could help mitigate the illicit trade. 
Cannabis regulation should ensure that all 
cannabis produced by legal manufacturers is 
accounted for. As cannabis manufacturers and 
distributors begin their overseas expansion, it 
is crucial to ensure that distribution data is ac-
curately and independently verified, and that 
amounts sold are commensurate to the size 
of local markets and legal exports. Releasing 
comprehensive, free, and easily accessible 
data covering the entirety of cannabis supply 
chains would be a necessary first step.
5. Conduct frequent policy evaluations 
Frequently reviewing regulatory frameworks 
and revising them accordingly would help en-
sure that harms related to health, justice, and 
trade along cannabis supply chains are effec-
tively minimised. Metrics could include mor-
bidity, mortality, and mental health impacts 
of regulation (health), the participation of civil 
society groups and communities affected by 
cannabis prohibition in the design and imple-
mentation of regulation (justice), and income 
and working conditions of all workers includ-
ing farmers (trade).174 Objective data, lessons 
learnt, market evolutions, and feedback from 
affected communities and civil society should 
form the basis of those reviews.175
6. Ensure that fair trade principles 
are at the core of regulation, as 
international trade develops
As the international trade in legal cannabis 
products continues to grow, regulators should 
ensure that fair trade principles are at the 
forefront of regional and international frame-
works, and that the illicit trade is not used as 
an industry tactic. This could include banning 
trade through Free Trade Zones and of du-
ty-free cannabis products,176 while carving out 
cannabis, alcohol, and tobacco products from 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms 
or repealing them altogether should also be 
considered.177
7. Develop international guidance on 
the legal cannabis trade
The WHO FCTC and the Protocol to Elimi-
nate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products offer 
important lessons for future international 
guidelines on the international legal cannabis 
trade. Limitations include extensive efforts by 
the tobacco industry to undermine and co-
opt their development, negotiation, drafting, 
and implementation.178 Even in the absence 
of an international treaty on legal cannabis, 
UN institutions (e.g., WHO, the United Na-
tions Development Programme and the Unit-
ed Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) should 
play a greater role in providing guidelines on 
cannabis regulation, including on how to mit-
igate the illicit cannabis trade while guarding 
against cannabis industry interference in pol-
icy making.179
8. Prevent the emergence of a powerful 
cannabis industry
Links between transnational tobacco compa-
nies and the cannabis industry already exist. 
Regulators could notably prohibit such links 
and prevent the increasing concentration and 
potential monopolisation of the cannabis in-
dustry – encouraging instead small, respon-
sible businesses, if a commercial model is 
selected. This could for instance be achieved 
by capping the market share of any cannabis 
company at 10 or 15%. 
9. Monitor and take action against 
cannabis industry interference into 
policy making 
TTCs have managed to interfere with policy 
making via academia, the media, law enforce-
ment, international governmental organisa-
tions, and other third parties. Given vested 
commercial interests potentially at odds with 
the social good, avoiding a similar situation 
with cannabis from expanding further could 
take the form of: 
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• Academic journals preventing studies on 
cannabis funded by the cannabis industry
• Universities rejecting cannabis industry re-
search funding
• Law enforcement and customs agencies 
refusing to partner with cannabis company 
representatives on how to tackle the illicit 
cannabis trade
• Preventing cannabis industry represent-
atives from shaping national regulation 
beyond public consultations and ensuring 
transparency in all interactions between the 
cannabis industry and government officials
• Requiring government officials involved in 
cannabis regulation to divest from any re-
lated financial interests
• Scrutinising and shedding light on cannabis 
industry donations to media and think tank 
organisations
• Creating an independent office to oversee 
and alert of potential conflicts of interest 
and interference in policy making by the 
cannabis industry. 
10. Put in place effective track-and-trace/
seed-to-sale systems
Learning from the current challenges in the 
implementation of the FCTC Protocol on the 
illicit trade in that regard, putting in place 
effective, independent, comprehensive, and 
transparent track-and-trace/seed-to-sale 
regimes, including audits and inspections, 
fully independent of the cannabis industry, 
could prove significant. Legal supply chains 
for cannabis products around the world con-
tinue to expand;180 product innovation and 
commercialisation (e.g., pre-rolled cannabis 
cigarettes181) is developing further; legal 
trade is growing; and the cannabis industry 
is becoming increasingly concentrated.182 In 
that context, one can certainly envisage a 
situation in which inadequate, industry-con-
trolled track-and-trace systems would fail to 
fully control supply chains across borders. 
More research is notably needed on seed-
to-sales solutions currently available in the 
United States and Canada, and on how reg-
ulations could be improved to ensure that 
tracking and tracing systems are effective, 
comprehensive, government-controlled, in-
dependent from the cannabis industry, and 
primarily focus on preventing diversion to 
the illicit trade, instead of serving as a tool 
to optimise supply chain productivity and 
efficiency.1183 Policy innovation is, however, 
required to ensure that these requirements 
do not represent additional barriers to en-
try for traditional growers, long marginalised 
and stigmatised by drug control, in favour of 
large, multinational corporations.
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